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Abstract
We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good
among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes, q ≥ 2. Sta-
tionary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with
deterministic protocol. We provide a monotonicity condition (satisfied by all single-
peak, strictly quasi-concave and concave utilities) that assures uniqueness for every
q whenever player’s utilities are symmetric around the peak. Without symmetry,
the monotonicity condition assures uniqueness for qualified majorities, q > n/2, pro-
vided that agents are sufficiently patient and utilities satisfy an additional regularity
condition. Asymptotic uniqueness is assured for qualified majorities by imposing
only the monotonicity condition.
Keywords: Bargaining, Voting, Qualified Majority, One-dimensional Policies, Single-
Peaked Preferences, Public Good Location.
JEL classification numbers: C78, D71,D72, D74.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines non-cooperative bargaining games in a classical environment of social
choice: A group of individuals must collectively choose a public good in a one-dimensional
interval of alternatives, over which individuals have single-peaked preferences. Examples
are the location of a public facility, the adoption of a public policy, or the allocation of a
budget among two public services.
It is well known1 that in these scenarios simple majority voting has very appealing
properties: It selects a Condorcet winner (the peak of a median voter), an outcome that
is immune to strategic manipulation and lies in the core of the underlying cooperative
game.
Still, simple majority is sometimes indecisive2 and, more importantly, collective deci-
sions often require levels of consensus other than a simple majority. For these situations,
predictions must rely on detailed examination of the bargaining processes by which alter-
natives gather decisive support. In this paper we are concerned with such environments.
We ask three main questions: What are collective decisions like when consensus over an
alternative is bargained over time? Under what conditions is it possible to give a sharp
prediction for the collective decision? How would this prediction depend on the intensity
of the consensus required? To address these questions, we analyze games taking place
over discrete time where a collective decision must be reached by a deterministic protocol
1See Moulin [9] and [10].
2With an even number of voters, the (weak) Condorcet winner is not unique.
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of alternating proposals and voting, under the assumption that agents are impatient. We
consider voting procedures that require the approval of a quota of players ranging from
minimal consensus to unanimity.
Our main message is that, for a wide range of utilities, the assumption that agents
discount future utilities exponentially has the usual drastic effect in selecting a unique
stationary equilibrium outcome. We show that, in spite of the public nature of the collec-
tive decision and the tight constraint of one-dimensionality, the bargaining problem is not
radically different from negotiations to split a private surplus. While any efficient decision
can be sustained as a stationary equilibrium among perfectly patient players, impatience
plays a powerful role in selecting a single alternative. When the utilities are symmetric
around the peak and satisfy a natural condition of monotonicity (satisfied by all con-
tinuous, strictly quasi-concave, and concave utilities) a unique stationary equilibrium is
assured for every quota, q = 2 to n, and for all discount factors. Without symmetry, the
monotonicity condition assures the selection of a unique outcome only when collective
decisions demand a (super)majority and agents are rather patient. We establish that, for
all q > n/2, monotonicity and an additional regularity condition assure a unique equilib-
rium provided that the agents are sufficiently patient. When the regularity condition is
not imposed, monotonicity assures asymptotic uniqueness: as players become arbitrarily
patient, all equilibrium outcomes converge to a unique limit (independently of the order
of play).
The arguments underlying our results are distinct from those that apply in multilateral
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negotiations to share a pie under the unanimity rule. In a standard pie-sharing bargaining
game where three or more players must reach a unanimous agreement to split a private
surplus, impatience (combined with stationarity) has a dramatic effect and shrinks the set
of equilibrium outcomes to a unique division of the surplus because: (a) to get acceptance
the proposer must offer to each opponent a share that is worth exactly their present
value of rejecting, and (b) since all shares must add up to one, each player’s value of
rejecting (assumed stationary) is determined by the shares that she must offer to receive
approval when she is the proposer. The constraints implied by (a) and (b) are tight
and determine equilibrium shares uniquely.3 This argument does not work in our set up
because proposals cannot be customized to each voter: when the support of more than
two players is needed, equilibrium proposals will easily deliver payoffs above continuation
values to some responders.
Our focus also departs from arguments based on the link between the core and the
set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria. When the players are perfectly patient, any
allocation in the core can be sustained as a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium out-
come (see Perry and Reny [12]). With an odd number of agents the core of a simple
majority game contains a single alternative, the peak of the median voter. Consequently,
under perfect patience, the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of
bargaining games where decisions are taken by simple majority is the peak of the me-
dian voter. Since the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium correspondence is upper-
3Under qualified majority rules, things are more complicated because only the least demanding players
need to be offered their expected continuation payoffs (see Eraslan [4]).
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hemicontinuous, games where players are sufficiently patient have a unique stationary
subgame perfect equilibrium as well, with outcomes that remain close to the peak of the
median voter.4 However, when a collective decision requires more than a simple majority,
the underlying cooperative game has a large core and arguments based on core equivalence
and upper-hemicontinuity do not help to attain uniqueness.
This paper is closely related to Banks and Duggan [1] and Cho and Duggan [3]. The
social choices that we discuss are a particular case of the more general problem addressed
by Banks and Duggan [1]. They consider a model of sequential bargaining where propos-
als, social alternatives, lie in arbitrary convex subsets of a multidimensional Euclidean
space. Proposers are selected at random and agreement is reached by an arbitrary voting
rule. They prove existence of equilibria under very general conditions, and they estab-
lish sufficient conditions for core equivalence.5 Their results, however, do not provide an
explicit characterization of equilibria nor a discussion of conditions for uniqueness. The
issue of uniqueness for one-dimensional problems is addressed in Cho and Duggan [3].
They show that under quadratic utilities, a game with random proposers and strong and
proper decisive coalitions has a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium.6 Their re-
sult is based on the existence of a unique core player, a property that fails at quotas other
than the simple majority. Our contribution is complementary; we establish (asymptotic)
uniqueness for a wide range of preferences and consensus requirements, but our results
4See Jackson and Moselle [6].
5For set-ups like ours, where alternatives are in an interval, they show that equilibria (in pure strate-
gies) exist; and that they are equivalent to core outcomes for perfectly patient players.
6When decisive coalitions are determined by a quota, only the simple majority is strong and proper.
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apply only to deterministic protocols. The issue of uniqueness for qualified majorities
under random proposers remains open.
Jackson and Moselle [6] is also related. They consider alternatives that have two
components, the location of a public good in an interval and the division of a private
good among the agents. Their concern is the nature of coalitions that may form when
decisions are taken with a procedure of alternating proposals and simple majority.
More indirectly, our work is also related to the literature that explores the (possible)
equivalence between the equilibria of non-cooperative games and the core of underlying
games in coalitional form (see Selten [14], Perry and Reny [12], Moldovanu and Winter
[8] and Evans [5]). The equivalence results of all these models rely fundamentally on the
assumption that players are perfectly patient; and might have the additional drawback of
little content when the core is either empty or a large set. Chatterjee et al. [2] and Hart
and Mas-Colell [7] present models where relaxing the assumption of perfect patience is
instrumental in attaining sharper predictions within a large core.7 Neither of these two
models, however, admits a formulation where the collective choice is the characteristic of
a public good on an interval.8
7In Chatterjee et al. [2] any efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibrium converges (as the impa-
tience diminishes) to the egalitarian allocation. In Hart and Mas-Colell [7] the stationary equilibrium
outcomes converge to a “Mashler-Owen consistent value payoff configuration” (which are unique and lie
in the core for specific formulations of the characteritic function).
8In our set up utilities are not transferable, and coalitional payoffs usually do not satisfy superadditiv-
ity, convexity or comprehensiveness. Chatterjee et al. [2] assume that the underlying game in coalitional
form has transferable utility and is superadditive. In Hart and Mas-Colell [7] coalitions can attain payoffs
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In the next section, the general bargaining model is presented. In section 3 we charac-
terize stationary subgame perfect equilibria and establish conditions assuring existence.
Conditions for uniqueness of the equilibrium are explored in section 4. The proofs omitted
in the main text are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
A set of agents I = {1, 2, ..., n} must collectively choose an alternative x in the interval
[0, 1]. The instantaneous preferences of each i ∈ I are described by a continuous and
strictly quasi-concave utility function, ui : [0, 1] → %+. Note that strict quasi-concavity
and continuity imply single-peakedness and strict monotonicity; that is, there is a unique
pi ∈ [0, 1] such that pi ∈ argmax {ui(x) : x ∈ [0, 1]}, ui(x) < ui(y) for x < y ≤ pi, and
ui(x) > ui(y) for pi ≤ x < y. The permutation of the peaks profile (p1, ..., pn) in increasing
order is denoted by (p1, ..., pn) with pk denoting its k-th term. To avoid trivial scenarios
we assume that at least two players have different peaks, and we set p1 = 0 and pn = 1
without loss of generality.
Some interpretations of this social choice problem are the following:
1. Choosing a policy or appointing a public official when the ideological contest con-
cerns a single issue.
2. Selecting the location of a public facility between two cities connected only by one
that lie in sets that are convex and comprehensive.
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road.
3. Deciding on the level of production of a public good subject to non-decreasing
marginal costs, under equal sharing of the costs. Strictly convex preferences over
public good and wealth combinations are represented by a single-peaked utilities
over the public good space.
4. Allocating a fixed budget to finance the production of two public goods. If the
preferences of the players are quasi-concave and increasing with respect to both
goods, the two-dimension problem can be reduced to the present one-dimensional
decision problem.
Decisions are bargained over discrete time t = 0, 1, ... with an infinite horizon. The
timing of the game is as follows. At t = 0 player 1 selects a proposal x ∈ [0, 1] and
sequentially the rest of players either accept or reject it. If x is accepted by at least
q − 1 responders, 2 ≤ q ≤ n, the collective decision x is implemented and the game ends.
Otherwise, the game moves to period t = 1 where 2 becomes the proposer. And so on.
The process continues until a proposal is supported by at least q players (one of them the
proposer). The utility of perpetual disagreement - where agents forego consumption of
the public good - is normalized to zero so that players unanimously (weakly) prefer any
agreement to perpetual disagreement. Upon termination of the game at t with decision x
the payoff of a player i is given by δtui (x) where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the common9 discount
factor.
9This is for convenience, the results go through with player-specific discount factors.
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Remark. For n = 2, although the set of feasible agreements is not necessarily con-
vex in the utility space, the preceding model is strategically equivalent to the standard
bargaining game of Rubinstein [13]. Things change for n ≥ 3 because the standard
requirements over utility sets easily break down. Consider, for instance, the example
displayed in Figure 1 where the utility set is neither convex nor comprehensive.
Figure 1. Feasible utilities set for u1 (x) = 1− |x− 1/2|, u2 (x) = 1− x and u3 (x) = x.
Histories, strategies and subgame perfect equilibria are defined in the standard way.
We focus our attention to stationary subgame perfect equilibria (henceforth SSPE). At
any SSPE agents play history independent strategies that constitute a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Thus, whenever they act as proposers, agents select the same alternative;
and they always use the same decision rule to accept/reject the proposals of a given
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opponent.
3 Characterization and Existence
In what follows, we fix δ ∈ (0, 1) and a profile of utility functions (u1, ..., un) and charac-
terize SSPE for the full range of quotas q = 2 to n. The stationary nature of strategies
crucially simplifies the characterization. First, the actions of all players depend only on
the current state (who is the proposer, what is the proposal), so that expected payoffs
at any subgame of a given equilibrium are fixed and independent of the history of play.
Second, disagreement cannot prevail in equilibrium because it offers the least payoff to
every player. Furthermore, for any strategy profile leading to an agreement with some
delay, there is a profitable deviation that anticipates agreement. Therefore the following
holds:
Lemma 1 Immediate Agreement. In any SSPE agreement is immediate.
An SSPE is characterized by a vector of proposals and acceptance rules, one for each
player, that are mutually best responses. Consider a proposer i that anticipates an im-
mediate decision on alternative x ∈ [0, 1] if the negotiation enters into the next period.
What alternative must she propose to attain the best possible agreement in the current
period? She must propose an alternative y that is acceptable, uj(y) ≥ δuj(x), for at least
q − 1 opponents j in I. To assess what alternatives can receive consensus to defeat the
prospect of agreement at x tomorrow (and to compute which one is best) we must, first,
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account for the fact that utilities increase up to the peak and then decrease; and second,
we need to keep track of what responders find each proposal acceptable. Although there
is no fundamental obstacle, that requires the bit of notation that we introduce next.
For each utility function u with peak at p, we define its associate left and right functions
as l : [0, p] → % and r : [p, 1] → %, where l (x) = u (x), r (x) = u (x) (the notation li
and ri will be used if necessary). The trade-offs between alternatives and delay for player
i are now easily evaluated: an immediate agreement at an alternative y dominates the
prospect of agreement at x with one period of delay provided that ui(y) ≥ δui (x); that
is, if and only if y ∈ [αi (x) ,αi (x)], where
αi (x) =

l−1i (δui (x)) if δui (x) ∈ [ui(0), ui(pi)] ,
0 otherwise;
αi (x) =

r−1i (δui (x)) if δui (x) ∈ [ui(1), ui(pi)] ,
1 otherwise.
When the approval of only m players in a set P ⊆ I is needed for the success of a
proposal, not all acceptance thresholds αi (x) and αi (x) are relevant. To keep track of
which ones are we use the following notation: rank the elements of
{
αj (x) : j ∈ P
}
and
{αj (x) : j ∈ P} in increasing and decreasing order respectively, and denote by αP,m (x)
and αP,m(x) the m − th terms in these rankings. Thus, when the approval of m players
i in P is necessary, proposal z beats the prospect of decision x in the next period if and
only if z ∈ [αP,m (x), αP,m(x)].
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Henceforth, whenever no confusion arises, we will write α (x) ≡ αI,q (x) and α(x) ≡
αI,q(x). We are now ready to provide a rather simple characterization of the best re-
sponses.
Lemma 2 Best Responses. Consider the game under quota q. For each x ∈ [0, 1] the
best response of proposer i at t when an immediate agreement x prevails at t + 1 is to
propose χi(x), where χi : [0, 1]→ % is defined as
χi(x) =

αI,q(x) if pi > αI,q(x),
αI,q (x) if pi < αI,q (x) ,
pi otherwise.
(1)
Proof. A proposal y by player i is acceptable upon the prospect of agreement at x with
one period of delay provided that y ∈ Aj (x) = [αj (x) ,αj (x)] for at least q−1 responders
j *= i; that is, y ∈ Ai,q(x) = [αI\{i},q−1 (x) ,αI\{i},q−1(x)]. Since the Aj (x) are connected
and contain x for all j ∈ I, it is immediate that Ai (x) ∩ Ai,q(x) *= ∅. Hence, for any
proposer i ∈ I, there exists proposals that are acceptable at least to q− 1 responders and
that i herself prefers over delay.
The best proposal of player i in Ai (x)∩Ai,q(x) must maximize ui in Ai,q(x). Further-
more, maximizing ui in Ai,q(x) is equivalent to maximizing ui in Aq(x) =
[
αI,q (x) ,αI,q(x)
] ⊆
Ai,q(x). To check this claim assume that the best alternative in Ai,q(x), say y, is not the
best alternative in Aq(x); i.e. y ∈ [αI\{i},q−1 (x) ,αI,q (x)) ∪ (αI,q (x) ,αI\{i},q−1 (x)] *= ∅. If
y ∈ [αI\{i},q−1 (x) ,αI,q (x)) *= ∅ then pi ≤ y < αI,q (x) since otherwise a proposal y′ > y
would be preferred by i and accepted by at least q−1 players. Moreover, since αi (x) ≤ pi
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we must conclude that y > max
{
αI\{i},q−1 (x) ,αi (x)
} ≥ αI,q (x) , which is a contradic-
tion. The symmetric argument rules out y ∈ (αI,q (x) ,αI\{i},q−1 (x)] *= ∅. Hence, for all i,
the optimal proposal when agreement on x prevails next period in case of rejection is to
propose an y maximizing ui in Aq(x) =
[
αI,q (x) ,αI,q(x)
]
= [α (x) ,α(x)]. If pi lies in this
interval then that is the best response proposal of player i; otherwise she must propose
α (x) or α(x), whatever is closer to pi.
We may now give a characterization of SSPE outcomes and establish that they exist.
Proposition 3 Characterization and Existence. Consider a game under quota
q. The following statements hold:
(i) An alternative x is an SSPE outcome if and only if
x = χ1 (χ2 (...χn−1 (χn (x)))) ,
where, for all i ∈ I, χi(x) are defined by Eq. (1).
(ii) An equilibrium exists.
Proof. First observe that restricting attention to pure strategies is without loss of gen-
erality (see the Appendix for a detailed proof of this claim).
Consider an SSPE that yields an immediate decision x. By stationarity, this outcome
prevails any time t that player 1 proposes. Therefore, at period t − 1 her predecessor in
the protocol, n, must propose χn (x) . Taking into account that at a stationary strategy
player 1 proposes the same alternative x whenever she intervenes as the proposer, (i)
follows by recursive use of Eq. (1).
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It is immediate that the χi (.) are continuous so that
w (x) = χ1 (χ2 (...χn−1 (χn (x))))
is also a continuous. Moreover, by construction 0 ≤ w (0) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ w (1) ≤ 1. Hence,
the existence of a x ∈ [0, 1] satisfying x = w (x) follows by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem
and the proof of (ii) is complete.
The existence of an SSPE is not a surprise (in fact, the existence result of Banks and
Duggan [1], for the case of random proposers, is substantially more general); however, the
present explicit characterization provides the tools to explore conditions for uniqueness.
4 Uniqueness
We now build on Proposition 3 to address conditions assuring uniqueness of the SSPE.
At this point it is useful to recall the classical argument for uniqueness of the equi-
librium due to Rubinstein [13]: when two agents bargain to split a private surplus, a
player expecting a large share is more ready to give up some gains to anticipate agree-
ment than a player expecting a small share. Because equilibrium proposals must balance
this trade-off for both players, and because what one agent gains the other must lose,
uniqueness is assured provided that the surplus-delay trade off is strictly monotonic. In
the present environment, the gain of an agent does not necessarily assure a loss to all her
counterparts. However, given the decision that prevails in the continuation, the proposer
needs only to satisfy the pivotal responder; leaving her indifferent assures that q−2 other
15
responders will strictly prefer to approve, and all the other players are irrelevant. Our
main point is that when decisions are one-dimensional, negotiations are ”essentially” two-
player bargaining problems between the proposer and the pivotal responder. Therefore
the condition for uniqueness is ”essentially” the Increasing Loss of Delay condition, which
assures uniqueness for two-player problems.10 We propose it next.
MCD Monotone Compensation for Delay. We say that ui satisfies Monotone
Compensation for Delay if the functions x− αi (x) and x− αi (x) are increasing.
Remark. Single-peakedness assures that x − αi (x) is increasing for all x > pi, and
that x−αi (x) is increasing for all x < pi. Thus, a single-peaked ui satisfies MCD if (i) the
measure of the left acceptance set [αi (x) , x] is increasing for x < pi; and (ii) the measure
of the right acceptance set [x,αi (x)] is decreasing for x > pi. In other words, for x < pi
(resp. x > pi) the range of acceptable proposals to the left (right) of x shrinks as x moves
away from the peak.
A natural domain of preferences where MCD holds is that of continuous, quasi-concave
and concave utilities.
Lemma 4 Concavity implies MCD.
(i) A utility function ui that is continuous, strictly quasi-concave and concave satisfies
MCD.
10See Osborne and Rubinstein [11]. The main difficulty that remains is that the identity of the relevant
”responder”, the pivotal voter, depends on the expected continuation outcome.
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(ii) A continuous, strictly quasi-concave utility function satisfying MCD may fail to
be concave.
See the Appendix for the proof of the first claim. The following example proves the
second.
Example 5 Non concave MCD utilities. Consider
ui : [0, 1]→ %+
ui(x) =

xk if x ≤ pi,
pki
(1−pi)k (1− x)
k if x > pi,
for k > 1.
This function is continuous, quasi-concave, satisfies MCD, and it is not concave. Consider
x ≤ pi ≤ y. Single-peakedness implies that x − αi (x) and y − αi (y) are increasing
functions. Moreover, it is easy to check that αi (x) = xδ
1/k and αi (y) = 1 − (1− y)δ1/k.
Hence x − αi (x) =
(
1− δ1/k) x, y − αi (y) = (1 − y)(δ1/k − 1) and both are strictly
increasing for all δ ∈ (0, 1).
Our next example shows that without MCD uniqueness fails even for two players.
Example 6 Multiple SSPE when MCD fails. Let I = {1, 2} with utilities
u1 (x) = e
1−x,
u2 (x) = e
x.
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It is immediate to check that MCD fails, and that all pairs (x, x− ln δ) , x ∈ [0, 1 + ln δ]
are a profile of SSPE proposals.
4.1 Symmetric utilities
A straight-forward condition that (with MCD) is sufficient for the uniqueness of the SSPE
is symmetry. We will argue that when the agents utilities are symmetric around the peak
and satisfy MCD the best response correspondences of all players are contractions. As an
SSPE outcome is a fix point of the contraction obtained by a composition of contractions,
it must be unique. This holds for every quota q.
Proposition 7 Symmetry and MCD imply uniqueness for any quota. Assume
that ∀i ∈ I utilities are symmetric, ui(x) = fi(|pi − x|), and satisfy MCD. Then the SSPE
is unique for all q ≥ 2.
Proof. The proof builds in Lemmata 14, 15 and 16, which are stated and proved in
the Appendix. First, Lemma 14 establishes that MCD and symmetry imply that αi and
αi are contractions. Second, Lemma 15 establishes that, for every q, when all αi and
all αi are contractions for all i ∈ I then α and α are contractions. Third, Lemma 16
establishes that if α and α are contractions then the best response, χi (.), is a contraction
for every i ∈ I. By Lemmata 14, 15 and 16, and Proposition 3 the equilibrium function
w (x) = χ1 (χ2 (...χn−1 (χn (x)))), being the composition of contractions, is a contraction
as well. Consequently, w (x) = x has a unique solution and the result follows.
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4.2 Qualified majorities and patient players
Although it is far from being a necessary condition for uniqueness of the SSPE, symmetry
cannot be dispensed with in our proof of Proposition 7. Nonetheless, replacing symmetry
by a regularity condition on the utilities, we can establish that MCD assures uniqueness
when the consensus required is a qualified majority and the agents are sufficiently patient.
Our argument crucially relies on the implications of the following observations.
Lemma 8 For q > n/2 and MCD utilities, if 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1, then x−χi (x) < y−χi (y)
for all i ∈ I.
Lemma 9 It is impossible to sustain two different SSPE where the proposals are (x1, ..., xn)
and (y1, ..., yn) such that xi+1 − xi < yi+1 − yi for all i ∈ I.
Lemma 8 is proved in the Appendix. To see that Lemma 9 holds it suffices to observe
that if xi+1 − xi < yi+1 − yi for all i ∈ I, then
n−1∑
i=1
(xi+1 − xi) + (x1 − xn) <
n−1∑
i=1
(yi+1 − yi) + (y1 − yn),
which yields a contradiction.
Consider now two potential SSPE outcomes x < y. By Lemma 8, x−χi (x) < y−χi (y)
for all i ∈ I. Hence, by Lemma 9, sustaining x and y as SSPE outcomes, requires that
the inequality x = x1 < y1 = y is reversed at the proposals of some player j > 1, so
that yj ≥ xj. Then, to attain (two) fixed points, another reversal, yj′ < xj′ , is needed
for some j′ > j (in fact an even number of reversals must occur). To establish the
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uniqueness of SSPE for qualified majorities we will argue that, under MCD and the
appropriate regularity condition, either reversals are impossible or they have measures
that are incompatible with the existence of more than one SSPE.
When players are sufficiently patient, reversals may occur only when the continuation
outcome lies within a small interval of their peak. Thus, the regularity condition that we
impose applies to players whose peaks are interior and relevant given q. For these players,
we will require that, under sufficient patience, when a player expects that an alternative
close to her peak prevails in the continuation, unless her best response is precisely her
peak, she is not the sole determinant of the acceptance set. To give a formal statement
of the requirement, the following notation is used for the relevant subsets of I: Iq =
{i ∈ I|0 < pn−q+1 ≤ pi ≤ pq < 1} , Li = {j ∈ I, |pj < pi} , and Ri = {j ∈ I, |pj > pi} .
REG ε−regularity. Fix q > n/2 and ε > 0. We say that the utility profile (u1, .., un)
is ε− regular at q if there exists δε such that, for any δ > δε and all i ∈ Iq, either a)
(pi − ε)−αi (pi − ε) > (pi + ε)−αh (pi + ε) for all h ∈ Ri, and αi (pi + ε)−(pi + ε) >
αj (pi − ε)− (pi − ε) for all j ∈ Li; or b) α (pi + ε) ≤ pi ≤ α (pi − ε) .
The set of players i ∈ Iq, for whom condition a) holds is specially relevant in the
sequel; we denote it as Iq. Under MCD, a) implies that, for all z ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] ,
z − αh (z) < (pi + ε)− αh (pi + ε) < (pi − ε)− αi (pi − ε) ≤ z − αi (z) for all h ∈ Ri, and
αj (z)−z > αi (z)−z, for all j ∈ Li. Consequently, for all i ∈ Iq, the following observation
applies:
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R1 For all z ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] and δ ≥ δε,
1. αh (z) > αi (z) for all h ∈ Ri, and
2. αj (z) < αi (z) for all j ∈ Li.
In fact, ε-regularity and MCD have much stronger implications. When players are
sufficiently patient, for a set of continuations z that remain sufficiently close to pi, both
acceptance bounds of player i remain below those of player h ∈ Ri and above those of
players j ∈ Li. This is our next result, which is proved in the Appendix:
Lemma 10 Assume a profile of MCD and ε - regular utilities. If i ∈ Iq then there exist
ε, δ ∈ (0, 1) such that the following property holds:
R2 For all z ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] and δ ≥ δ,
1. αj (z) < αi (z) < αh (z) for all h ∈ Ri, j ∈ Li, and
2. αh (z) > αi (z) > αj (z) for all j ∈ Li, h ∈ Ri.
R2 is very useful to determine what players are relevant for the acceptance set [α (z) ,α (z)]
when z lies in the neighborhood of a given interior peak pi, 0 < pi < 1. For pi ∈
(pn−q+1, pq) , it assures that i is irrelevant; for pi = pq or pi = pn−q+1, it implies that
α = αi or α = αi, respectively.
We are now ready to establish that sufficient patience assures uniqueness for all q >
n/2.
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Proposition 11 Uniqueness for qualified majorities and patient players.
Fix q > n/2 and a profile of MCD utilities where pi *= pj∀i, j ∈ I. If (u1, ..., un) is ε̂ -
regular for some ε̂ > 0, then there exists δ̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for δ ≥ δ̂, the SSPE is
unique.
The detailed proof is in the Appendix. The outline of the argument is as follows.
First, we observe that when agents are sufficiently patient, if two different alternatives
are SSPE outcomes, then they must be close to the peak of some player i such that
pn−q+1 ≤ pi ≤ pq. In the second and third step we assume that 0 < pi < 1, and using
the implications of ε̂− regularity and MCD we derive a contradiction: the second step
establishes that pi /∈ (pn−q+1, pq); and the third step rules out that pi = pn−q+1 or pi = pq.
The fourth step takes care of the case pi = 0 or 1, (which is relevant only when q = n)
and completes the proof. The assumption that all peaks are different is for convenience
and can be relaxed.
The following are examples of environments where the conditions of Proposition 11
are met.
1. MCD utilities, and unanimity.
Under unanimity Iq = ∅, so ε- regularity is trivially satisfied for all δ and all ε.
2. MCD utilities, n odd, and simple majority.
The simple majority requirement trivially assures that the regularity condition is
met: q = n+12 implies that I
q = {i|pi = pn−q+1 = pq} , and for all z ∈ [0, 1], α (z) ≤
pi ≤ α (z) for all δ.
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3. Differentiable MCD utilities and any qualified majority.
The differentiability of utilities implies the regularity condition: By differentiability
and single peakedness u′i(pi) = 0, u
′
h(pi) > 0 for h ∈ Ri, and u′j(pi) < 0 for j ∈ Li.
It is easy to check that for pi ∈ (0, 1) and δ sufficiently close to 1, if h ∈ Ri,
then pi − αi(pi) > pi − αh(pi). 11 By continuity, for ε sufficiently small (pi − ε) −
αi (pi − ε) > (pi + ε)− αh (pi + ε). Similarly, for j ∈ Li, there are ε > 0 and δ < 1
such that αi (pi + ε)− (pi + ε) > αj (pi − ε)− (pi − ε).
4. MCD utilities that are identical except in the location of the peak, and any qualified
majority.
In this case the regularity condition follows by the combination of MCD with
identical utilities: Given q > n/2 and an i ∈ Iq there exists ε > 0 with ε <
εr = min {ph − pi : h ∈ Ri} such that ui (pi − ε) > uh (pi + ε) for all h ∈ Ri, since
pi+ε < ph−ε. MCD implies that (ph − ε)−αh (ph − ε) > (pi + ε)−αh (pi + ε) for all
δ. Since utilities are identical (ph − ε)−αh (ph − ε) = (pi − ε)−αi (pi − ε) and there-
fore (pi + ε)−αh (pi + ε) < (pi − ε)−αi (pi − ε) for all h ∈ Ri. Similarly, there exists
ε < εl = min {pi − pj : j ∈ Li} such that αj (pi − ε)−(pi − ε) < αi (pi + ε)−(pi + ε)
for all players j ∈ Li. Thus ε−regularity holds provided that, for all i ∈ Iq, ε is
small enough relative to the min{εr, εl}.
11Note that u′i (pi) = 0 ⇒ ∀κ > 0,∃δκ such that ui(pi)−ui(αi(pi))pi−αi(pi) =
ui(pi)(1−δ)
pi−αi(pi) < κ, ∀δ ≥ δκ. On the
other hand u′h (z) > 0 ∀z ≤ pi ⇒ ∃k > 0 such that
uh(pi)−uh(αh(pi))
pi−αh(pi) =
uh(pi)(1−δ)
pi−αh(pi) > k, ∀δ. Hence, for
κ < ui(pi)uh(pi)k, we have pi − αi (pi) > pi − αh (pi) , ∀δ ≥ δκ,
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To complete our analysis we now turn attention to the asymptotic uniqueness of SSPE
outcomes as the impatience of players vanishes, i.e. δ → 1.
4.3 Asymptotic uniqueness
Next we establish that for all qualified majorities, q > n/2, as players with MCD pref-
erences become arbitrarily patient, all SSPE outcomes approach to a unique alternative.
Furthermore, this convergence holds irrespective of the order by which players make pro-
posals. Thus, for environments with very patient players we can give a unique (limit)
prediction that depends only on the configuration of individual preferences and the qual-
ified majority required. The intuition behind this result is simple: given q and for δ
sufficiently high, only equilibrium proposals that are very close to pn−q+1 or pq, say in
(pn−q+1 − ε, pn+q−1 + ε) ∩ [0, 1] or (pq − ε, pq + ε) ∩ [0, 1], might induce reversals in the
best responses (which, by Lemmata 8 and 9, are necessary to sustain multiple SSPE).
However, as patience increases these (disjoint) intervals shrink and |χi (x)− x| becomes
arbitrarily small for all i ∈ I; thus, even if reversals in the best responses cannot be ruled
out, their impact is negligible.
Proposition 12 Asymptotic Uniqueness for qualified majorities. Let q > n/2
and assume that preferences satisfy MCD. For all ε > 0 there is δε ∈ (0, 1) such that if x1
and y1 are SSPE outcomes for δ ≥ δε, then |x1 − y1| < ε.
Proof. Lemma 18, establishes that when players are sufficiently patient, all the proposals
xi in a given SSPE must be nearby the initial proposal (and equilibrium outcome) x1.
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We now combine Lemma 18 with MCD to establish that as δ approaches 1 all SSPE
outcomes converge. Assume there is some ε > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, 1) there are two
SSPE outcomes with proposal profiles x = (x1, ..., xn) and y = (y1, ..., yn) such that x1+
ε/2 < y1−ε/2. (Note that the protocol at which x and y are SSPE need not be the same,
identifying the first proposer as player 1 is just for convenience).
Given ε > 0, by Lemma 18 there is a δε, such that, for δ ≥ δε, all xi ∈ (x1 − ε/2, x1 + ε/2)∩
[0, 1] and all yi ∈ (y1 − ε/2, y1 + ε/2) ∩ [0, 1] . Since xk < yj for all xk and yj, by Lemma
8, xk − χi (xk) < yj − χi (yj) for all i, j, k ∈ I. Therefore, using Lemma 9 we get a
contradiction.
Since the argument carries if the (deterministic) protocols by which x and y are the
SSPE outcomes are different, the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 13 Asymptotic Protocol Independence for Qualified Majorities.
Given a profile of MCD utilities and a qualified majority q > n/2, all SSPE converge to
the same outcome independently of the order of play.
Remark. The asymptotic independence of the protocol clearly fails in games where
decisions need only the approval of a minority. The intuition is simple: proposers always
seek the support of their neighbors. When only a small number of votes is necessary
(q ≤ n/2), there is no subset of players whose vote is needed by every proposer; therefore
equilibrium outcomes may change drastically depending on the order by which players
propose.
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5 Conclusions
We have explored multilateral bargaining on a one-dimensional characteristic of a public
good when decisions require the favorable vote of at least q participants under a determin-
istic protocol of alternating proposals. For the full range of quota requirements (ranging
from minority consensus to unanimity) we provided a characterization of SSPE, and we
establish sufficient conditions assuring uniqueness.
When decisions require a consensus weaker than unanimity, assuming that everyone
gains in every agreement is an important limitation of our analysis, since it excludes
environments where decisive coalitions may impose alternatives at which some players
are worse off than in perpetual disagreement. Unfortunately, addressing these scenarios
poses difficulties that we could not resolve, because neither existence nor uniqueness can
be assured.
Our results provide a useful tool to address issues of coalition formation. Since the
provision of public goods is a main motivation fueling group formation and segregation,
precise predictions on bargaining within groups are fundamental to discuss the formation
and stability of coalitions. We plan to explore this in future research.
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Appendix
Notation. The following notational conventions are used.
1. x, y, z denote generic alternatives in [0, 1]. x,y, z, denote generic profiles of alterna-
tives; whenever we refer to x = (x1, ..., xn) as an SSPE profile of proposals we write
x to refer to the corresponding equilibrium outcome.
2. Given utility function u with peak at p and alternative z ∈ [0, 1], and its associated
left and right functions r and l (defined in Section 3), we denote by λ(z) and ρ(z)
the following two alternatives:
λ(z) =

l−1 (u (z)) if u (z) ∈ [u (0) , u (p)] ,
0 otherwise,
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and
ρ(z) =

r−1 (u (z)) if u (z) ∈ [u (p) , u (1)] ,
1 otherwise.
That is, λ(z) (resp ρ(z)) is the alternative to the left (right) of p that gives the
feasible utility closest to u (z) ; thus, for z ≤ p, λ(z) = z, and ρ(z) = z for z ≥ p.
Subindexed λi and ρi will be used if necessary.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Claim: There is no SSPE where the players use strictly mixed strategies.
Consider a profile of stationary strategies. Player i’s strategy specifies her proposal
and her acceptance/rejection rule to the opponent’s proposals. Strategies are history inde-
pendent; thus proposals are independent of past play and acceptance/rejection decisions
depend only on the standing proposal and, possibly, on who the proposer is.
By stationarity, the continuation expected outcome x is independent on the actions of
the players in the current period. Given this expected outcome, the proposer can choose
among a set of outcomes which is a closed interval [α (x) ,α (x)] ⊆ [0, 1]. Moreover, the
utilities of the players are continuous an strictly quasi-concave so that there is a unique
optimal proposal for any interval [α (x) ,α (x)].
Let us now check that the strategy cannot be mixed in the stage of acceptance. This
could be only when some player is indifferent between continuation and the proposal. If
some player rejects the proposal with positive probability, then it will be in the interest
of the proposer to increase the utility of this player by changing marginally her proposal
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so that she accepts it. This is possible if no other player gets a payoff equal or smaller
than her continuation utility. However, this proposal exists for any continuation payoff
(since δ ∈ (0, 1)).
Proof of Lemma 4(i).
We prove that if ui = u is continuous, strictly quasi-concave and concave then x− αi (x)
is increasing for all x ∈ [0, 1]. A symmetric argument proves that x−αi (x) is increasing.
(In what follows we drop subindex i except in αi and αi.)
Since u is continuous, strictly quasi-concave and concave, it has a unique maximum.
Given, x, x′ ∈ [0, 1], x < x′, we distinguish three cases depending on the position of x, x′
relative to the peak p:
1. Let p ≤ x < x′. In this case the desired inequality holds without appealing to
concavity: Since u (x) > u (x′) then αi (x) ≥ αi (x′), and it is immediate that
x− αi (x) < x′ − αi (x′) .
2. Let x < x′ ≤ p. In this case, (1 − δ)u (x) = u (x) − δu (x) < u (x′) − δu (x′) =
(1− δ)u (x′).
(a) Assume that δu (x) ∈ [u (0) , u (p)], which implies δu (x′) ∈ [u (0) , u (p)]. Ob-
serve that δu (z) = u (l−1 (δu (z))) since, for any z ∈ [0, p] , l (z) = u (z). Hence,
u (x)− u (l−1 (δu (x))) < u (x′)− u (l−1 (δu (x′))) .
The concavity of u, implies that
u (x)− u (x− a) ≥ u (x′)− u (x′ − b) for any a ≥ b.
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Rewrite l−1 (δu (x′)) = x′ − b and l−1 (δu (x)) = x − a, and use the previous
inequalities to conclude that a < b. Hence, x − αi (x) = x − l−1 (δu (x)) <
x′ − l−1 (δu (x′)) = x′ − αi (x′) .
(b) Assume δu (x) /∈ [u (0) , u (p)] , so that αi (x) = 0, and δu (x′) ∈ [u (0) , u (pi)] .
Consider y ∈ [x, x′] such that δu (y) = u (0) and use (a) to conclude that
x− αi (x) = x < y = y − l−1 (δu (y)) < x′ − l−1 (δu (x′)) = x′ − α (x′) .
(c) If δu (x) /∈ [u (0) , u (p)] and δu (x′) /∈ [u (0) , u (p)] then αi (x) = 0 and αi (x′) =
0 and obviously x− αi (x) = x < x′ = x′ − αi (x′) .
3. Let x < p < x′. Now consider λ(x′) (recall that λ(x′) = l−1(u(x′)) if u(x′) ∈
[u(0), u(p)], and λ(x′) = 0 otherwise) and observe that αi(λ(x
′)) = αi (x
′) . If x <
λ(x′) ≤ p then the desired inequality follows from Case 2:
x− αi (x) < λ(x′)− αi (λ(x′)) < x′ − αi (x′) .
If λ(x′) ≤ x < p, then αi (x) ≥ αi (λ(x′)) = αi (x′) , and therefore
x− αi (x) < x′ − αi (x′) .
Hence, concavity implies MCD.
Proof of Lemma 8.
Step 1. We show that 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1 implies that y − α (y) > x− α (x) and y − α (y) >
x− α (x).
What follows proves the first implication; a similar argument proves the second.
Note that for any x, y, 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1 the following observations hold:
31
(i) There is a subset of the players, Q ⊂ I, #Q ≥ n− q + 1, such that αj (y) ≥ α (y)
for all j ∈ Q. This follows directly from the definition of α (y).
(ii) MCD implies that y − αi (y) > x− αi (x) for all i ∈ I.
To establish the claimed inequality we proceed by contradiction. Assume that y −
α (y) ≤ x− α (x). Then α (x) < αj (x) for all j ∈ Q, since otherwise, (i) implies that
y − αj (y) ≤ y − α (y) ≤ x− α (x) ≤ x− αj (x) for some j ∈ Q,
which contradicts (ii). However, since #Q ≥ n − q + 1, α (x) must be an acceptable
alternative when the continuation outcome is x for least one player in Q. Therefore α (x) ≥
min
{
αj (x) : j ∈ Q
}
, which is also a contradiction. !
Step 2. For any x, y, 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1, we examine all possible values of the best
response to x, χi (x) , to establish that y − χi (y) > x− χi (x):
(i) χi (x) = α (x). Using Step 1 and the definition of χi (·), y − χi (y) ≥ y − α (y) >
x− α (x) = x− χi (x) .
(ii) χi (x) = pi. If χi (y) = pi, the claim follows directly. Otherwise, either χi (y) =
α (y) or χi (y) = α (y). If χi (y) = α (y), then α (y) ≤ pi ≤ α (x) since pi ∈ [α (x) ,α (x)].
Hence, y−χi (y) = y−α (y) ≥ y−pi > x−pi = x−χi (x). If χi (y) = α (y), using Step 1 and
the fact that pi ∈ [α (x) ,α (x)] we get y−χi (y) = y−α (y) > x−α (x) ≥ x−pi = x−χi (x).
(iii) χi (x) = α (x). We distinguish three subcases: if χi (y) = α (y) the result follows
directly from Step 1. The case χi (y) = pi can occur only if α (y) ≤ pi ≤ α (x) since
pi ∈ [α (y) ,α (y)] and pi ≤ α (x). Therefore, y − χi (y) = y − pi > x − pi ≥ x − α (x) =
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x−χi (x). The last possibility is that χi (y) = α (y), which occurs when α (y) ≤ pi ≤ α (x).
Therefore, y − χi (y) = y − α (y) ≥ y − pi > x− pi ≥ x− α (x) = x− χi (x). !
Proof of Lemma 10.
Let D = min {|pi − pj| : i, j ∈ I, pi *= pj} . Take an ε < min {ε, D/2} such that if z ∈
[pi − ε, pi + ε] then both λi (z) , ρi (z) ∈ [pi −D/2, pi + D/2].
Recall observation R1, i.e. for all δ ≥ δε, αi (z) > αj (z) for all j ∈ Li and αi (z) <
αh (z) for all h ∈ Ri. To prove R2-1, we need to show that there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) , δ ≥ δε,
such that for all δ > δ if z ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] then αh (z) > αi (z) for all h ∈ Ri. Consider an
h ∈ Ri, and note that single-peakedness implies αh (z) ≥ ph for all δ ∈ (0, 1). There exists
δ˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ≥ δ˜, by definition αi (z) = αi (ρi (z)) = r−1i (δui (ρi (z))) ,
and r−1i (ui (ρi (z))) = ρi (z) (note that δ˜ can be selected to guarantee that δui (ρi (z)) ∈
[ui (1) , ui (pi)] for all δ ≥ δ˜, and thus r−1 is well defined). For z ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] fixed,
consider the difference r−1i (δui (ρi (z))) − r−1i (ui ((ρi (z)))) for δ ≥ δ˜. This difference
is a continuous function of δ, which has value zero at δ = 1. Hence, there exists δ ≥
max
{
δε, δ˜
}
such that
r−1i (δui (ρi (z)))− r−1i (ui ((ρi (z)))) = αi (ρi (z))− ρi (z) < ε for all δ > δ,
and, since ρi (z) < pi + D/2,
αi (z) = αi (ρi (z)) < pi + D/2 + ε < pi + D ≤ ph ≤ αh (z) for all δ > δ.
R2 - 2 is proved analogously.
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Proof of Proposition 11.
Some preliminary remarks are in order. By Lemma 10 we can select ε, δ ∈ (0, 1), ε <
min {ε̂, D/2} , D = mini,j∈I {|pi − pj| : pi *= pj} , such R2 holds for all i ∈ Iq. On the other
hand, by Lemma 20, ε and δ can be selected so that, in addition to R2 for all i ∈ Iq,
the following technical property (that follows by continuity and single-peakness) is also
assured for all i ∈ I :
SIGN: Either |λi (x)− λi (y)| ≤ |ρi (x)− ρi (y)| for all x, y ∈ [p− ε, p + ε], or the reverse
weak inequality holds throughout this interval.
Next we prove the proposition in four steps.
Step 1. Claim: There exist δ1 ∈ (0, 1) such that, ∀δ > δ1, if x and y are SSPE with
outcomes x < y then there is some pi ∈ [pn−q+1, pq] such that xj, yj ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε]∩ [0, 1]
for all j ∈ I.
By Lemma 18, for ε/4 > 0, there is a δ1 ≥ δbε (where δbε < 1 is the δ lower bound for
ε̂-regularity), such that if δ > δ1 and z is an SSPE, then zi ∈ (z − ε/4, z + ε/4)∀i ∈ I.
Fix δ > δ1 and assume that x and y are SSPE with outcomes x < y. By Lemma 19,
|x− y| < ε/2 and (x− ε/4, y + ε/4) ∩ {p1, ..., pn} = pi. Since pi ∈ (x− ε/4, y + ε/4) and
zi ∈ (x− ε/4, y + ε/4) for z = x, y, it follows that
zi − pi ≤ y + ε/4− [x− ε/4] = y − x + ε/2 < ε,
and
zi − pi ≥ x− ε/4− [y + ε/4] = − (y − x)− ε/2 > −ε/2− ε/2 = −ε;
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and therefore all proposals in x and y lie in [pi − ε, pi + ε] ∩ [0, 1].
We can rule out that pi ∈ [0, pn−q+1) ∪ (pq, 1]: Otherwise, there is a player j with
pj ∈ [pn−q+1, pq] that proposes xj = yj = pj in both equilibria (since it is acceptable at both
alleged equilibrium continuations); this contradicts that x < y. Hence, pi ∈ [pn−q+1, pq].
!
Before we proceed to Step 2, note that for i ∈ Iq the hypothesis that x and y are SSPE
with outcomes x, y ∈ [pi − ε̂, pi + ε̂] , x < y, rules out that α (pi + ε̂) ≤ pi ≤ α (pi − ε̂) ,
i.e. condition b) in the definition of ε̂-regularity. The reason is simple; under b) the
equilibrium proposal of player i ought to be the same at both SSPE, contradicting that
x < y. Hence, in what follows, ε̂-regularity implies condition a). Thus, given the peak
identified in Step 1, either 0 < pn−q+1 ≤ pi ≤ pq < 1 which implies that i ∈ Iq and R2
applies; or else, q = n and pi = p1 = 0 or pi = pn = 1.
In Steps 2 and 3, we maintain the assumption that 0 < pn−q+1 ≤ pi ≤ pq < 1. In Step
4, we take care of the cases where pi = pq = 0, or pi = pn − q + 1 = 1.
Step 2. Claim: Let pi ∈ (0, 1). There exist δ2 ∈ (0, 1) such that, ∀δ ≥ δ2, if x
and y are SSPE with outcomes x < y and xj, yj ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] for all j ∈ I, then
pi /∈ (pn−q+1, pq).
We will establish that the claim holds for δ2 = max
{
δ1, δ
}
. Assume δ ≥ δ2, which
implies R2, and let pi ∈ (pn−q+1, pq). By R2, αh (z) > αi (z) and αh (z) > αj (z) for
all z ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] for all j ∈ Li and all h ∈ Ri. Moreover, pi < pq implies that
#Ri ≥ n − q + 1, so that, by Lemma 21, α is a contraction in [pi − ε, pi + ε]. Similarly,
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we can argue that α is a contraction in [pi − ε, pi + ε]. Applying Lemma 16 we conclude
that the best responses of all players are contractions in [pi − ε, pi + ε], implying that at
most one equilibrium can be attained in this interval, which is a contradiction. !
Step 3. Claim: Let pi ∈ (0, 1) and δ ≥ δ2. If x and y are SSPE with outcomes x < y
and xj, yj ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] for all j ∈ I, then neither pi = pn−q+1 nor pi = pq. We prove
that pi *= pn−q+1; the proof that pi *= pq is analogous.
Since δ2 ≥ δ, we establish the claim for each of the two possible cases allowed by
SIGN.
Case 1: |λi (x)− λi (y)| ≥ |ρi (x)− ρi (y)| for all x, y ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε].
For this case, we can establish that α and α are contractions in [pn−q+1 − ε, pn−q+1 + ε]
and apply Lemma 16 to obtain a contradiction. Since pi = pn−q+1 < pq, the same
argument of Step 2 applies to see that α is a contraction. To complete the proof of the
claim for this case, we show that α is a contraction. Note that # (Li ∪ {i}) = n− q + 1,
so that R2 implies that αi = α. Hence it will suffice to prove that αi is a contraction
in this interval. Assume w.l.o.g. ρi (x) < ρi (y) . Then, by MCD αi (ρi (x)) − ρi (x) >
αi (ρi (y))− ρi (y) and, by single-peakedness, αi (ρi (x)) ≤ αi (ρi (y)) . Thus,
|αi (ρi (y))− αi (ρi (x))| < |ρi (y)− ρi (x)| .
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Note as well that that, in the present case, |ρi (y)− ρi (x)| ≤ |y − x| . 12 Now, using
|αi (ρi (y))− αi (ρi (x))| = |αi (y)− αi (x)| we conclude that |αi (y)− αi (x)| < |y − x| . !
Case 2 |λi (x)− λi (y)| ≤ |ρi (x)− ρi (y)| ∀x, y ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] .
Presently α may not be a contraction; so we need a direct contradiction to the hypoth-
esis that two different SSPE exist. Departing from this hypothesis, note that, at least in
one of the two alleged SSPE, say in x, the proposal of agent i must be different from her
peak, xi *= pi = pn−q+1. Thus, x is such that xh = α (xh+1) for h ∈ Ri, xj = α (xj+1) for
j ∈ Li, and either xi = α (xi+1) or xi = α (xi+1). Assume, w.l.o.g., the first possibility,
xi = α (xi+1) . There exist aj ≥ 0 and bh ≥ 0 such that
xj = α (xj+1) = xj+1 − aj for j ∈ Li ∪ {i} and xh = α (xh+1) = xh+1 + bh for h ∈ Ri.
Also, note that for any z, w ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] there is an h ∈ Ri such that α (z) = αh (z)
and by ε̂-regularity and MCD
z − αh (z) ≤ (pi + ε)− αh (pi + ε) < (pi + ε̂)− αh (pi + ε̂)
< (pi − ε̂)− αi (pi − ε̂) < (pi − ε)− αi (pi − ε) ≤ w − αi (w) ,
so that
z − α (z) < w − αi (w) for all z, w ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] . (2)
Next, observe that if z,α (z) ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] then α (z) ,λi (z) ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε]. Recall
that since # (Li ∪ {i}) = n − q + 1, R2 assures that α (z) = αi (z) and by definition
12To check this, consider all possible cases: (i) x = ρi (x), y = ρi (y), (ii) x = ρi (x), y = λi (y),
(iii) x = λi (x), y = ρi (y) and (iv) x = λi (x), y = λi (y), and use |λi (x)− λi (y)| ≥ |ρi (x)− ρi (y)|,
ρi (x) < ρi (y) and (by single-peakedeness) λi (x) ≥ λi (y).
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λi (pi) = ρi (pi) = pi. To check that α (z) ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] , note that |λi (x)− λi (y)| ≤
|ρi (x)− ρi (y)| implies that
|pi − αi (z)| = |pi − λi (αi (z))| ≤ |pi − ρi (αi (z))| = |pi − αi (z)| = |pi − α (z)| < ε.
Since α (z) ≥ min {αh (z) : h ∈ Ri}, R2 implies z−α (z) < z−αi (z), so that pi−α (z) <
pi−αi (z). Therefore, α (z) ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] when pi−α (z) ≥ 0; and since pi−α (z) < 0
implies that α (z) ∈ (pi, z) , then α (z) ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] as well. To see that λi (z) ∈
[pi − ε, pi + ε] just note that |pi − λi (z)| ≤ |pi − ρi (z)| ≤ |pi − αi (z)| = |pi − α (z)| ≤ ε.
Consider equilibrium proposals xj+1, xh+1 ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] such that for j ∈ Li ∪
{i} and h ∈ Ri, xj = α (xj+1) and xh = α (xh+1) ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε]. By the previous
observation α (xh+1) ,λi (xh+1) ∈ [pi − ε, pi + ε] as well. Using (2), yields
xj+1 − α (xj+1) < λi (xh+1)− αi (λi (xh+1)) = λi (xh+1)− λi (αi (xh+1)) ≤
≤ |ρi (xh+1)− ρi (αi (xh+1))| = ρi (αi (xh+1))− ρi (xh+1) =
= αi (xh+1)− ρi (xh+1) ≤ αi (xh+1)− xh+1 = α (xh+1)− xh+1.
Hence, for any j ∈ Li∪{i} and any h ∈ Ri, aj = xj+1−α (xj+1) < α (xh+1)−xh+1 = bh.
Since q > n/2 implies that #Ri ≥ #(Li ∪ {i}), we conclude that∑
j∈Li∪{i}
aj =
∑
j∈Li∪{i}
(xj+1 − α (xj+1)) <
∑
h∈Ri
(α (xh+1)− xh+1) =
∑
h∈Ri
bh
But this contradicts the hypothesis that x is an SSPE, since, by definition at an SSPE∑
j∈Li∪{i}
aj =
∑
h∈Ri
bh.
Under the assumption that xi = α (xi+1) the symmetric argument applies, taking into
account that # (Ri ∪ {i}) ≥ #Li. !
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Step 4. Claim: There exists δ3 ∈ [δ2, 1) such that ∀δ ≥ δ3, it is impossible to sustain
two SSPE x and y with outcomes x < y, and xj, yj ∈ [0, ε] for all j ∈ I. And similarly
for xj, yj ∈ [1− ε, 1] .
Assume that the peak identified in Step 1 is pi = p1 = 0. Then q = n, Li = ∅, and
0 = αi (z) ≤ αh (z) for all h ∈ Ri. Since #Ri ≥ n−q+1, by Lemma 21, α is a contraction
in [0, ε] .
Moreover, there exists δ3 ∈ [δ2, 1) such that for all δ > δ3 if z ∈ [0, ε] with ε < D/2
then αh (z) ≥ αi (z) for all h ∈ Ri. To see this, take h ∈ Ri, and note that single-
peakedness implies αh (z) ≥ ph for all δ ∈ (0, 1). There exists δ˜ ∈ (0, 1) (that guarantees
that r−1i (δui (z)) is well defined for all δ ≥ δ˜), such that for all δ ≥ δ˜, by definition
αi (z) = r
−1
i (δui ((z))) ,
r−1i (ui (z)) = z.
For z ∈ [0, ε] fixed and δ ≥ δ˜, consider the difference r−1i (δui (z)) − r−1i (ui (z)) as a the
function of δ; this function is continuous and has value zero at δ = 1. Hence, there exists
δ3 ≥ max
{
δ2, δ˜
}
such that
r−1i (δui (z))− r−1i (ui (z)) = αi (z)− z < ε for all δ > δ3.
And, since z ≤ ε and ε < D/2,
αi (z) ≤ 2ε < D ≤ ph ≤ αh (z) for all δ > δ3 and all h ∈ Ri.
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Therefore, since # {i} ≥ n − q + 1, by Lemma 21, α is a contraction in [0, ε]. Thus, for
δ > δ3, by Lemma 16, the best responses are contractions in [0, ε], so that this interval
admits at most one SSPE outcome.
A similar argument covers the case pi = pn = 1.!
Taking δ̂ = δ3, Steps 1 to 4 imply that for δ ≥ δ̂ there is a unique SSPE.
Lemma 14 Assume that the utility of player i satisfies MCD and symmetry, ui (x) =
fi(|x− pi|). Then αi and αi are contractions; that is for all x, y ∈ [0, 1] with x *= y,
|αi (x)− αi (y)| < |x− y| and |αi (x)− αi (y)| < |x− y| .
Proof. We prove that |αi (x)− αi (y)| < |x− y|. A similar argument establishes that
|αi (x)− αi (y)| < |x− y|.
Depending on the position of x and y relative to pi we distinguish three cases: (i)
If x < y ≤ pi, then y − αi (y) > x − αi (x) ≥ 0 follows from MCD. Moreover, single-
peakedness implies αi (y) ≥ αi (x). Therefore, |αi (y)− αi (x)| < |y − x|. (ii) If x <
pi < y, by symmetry |x− λi(y)| < |x− y|. Moreover, by definition αi (y) = αi (λi(y))
and by (i), |αi (x)− αi (λi(y))| < |x− λi(y)| (note that αi (y) = αi (λi(y)) holds even
though ui(y) > ui(λi(y))). Hence, |αi (x)− αi (y)| = |αi (x)− αi (λi(y))| < |x− λi(y)| <
|x− y|. (iii) If pi ≤ x < y, consider λi(y) and λi(x) and notice that symmetry im-
plies that |λi(x)− λi(y)| ≤ |x− y| , (possibly with strict inequality when λi(y) = 0);
then using (i), αi (x) = αi (λi(x)) , and αi (y) = αi (λi(y)) we obtain |αi (x)− αi (y)| =
|αi (λi(x))− αi (λi(y))| < |λi(x)− λi(y)| ≤ |x− y|.
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Lemma 15 If αi is a contraction for all i ∈ I, then α is a contraction; and similarly for
αi and α.
Proof. Consider any x, y ∈ [0, 1] and assume w.l.o.g. x < y. Since the functions
αi are continuous for all players, there is a finite collection of alternatives zk ∈ [x, y],
x = z0 < z1 < ... < zK+1 = y, at which the pivotal player(s) determining α change(s).
That is, there exists h : {0, 1, ..., K} → I, such that α(zk) = αh(k−1)(zk) = αh(k)(zk), and
for ε > 0 and sufficiently small, α(zk − ε) = αh(k−1)(zk − ε) and α(zk + ε) = αh(k)(zk + ε),
where h(k − 1) and h(k) denote the player(s) that stop and begin being pivotal at zk (as
we move from x to y). That is, the function α restricted to the interval [x, y] is given by
α (z) =

αh(0) (z) if x = z0 ≤ z ≤ z1
αh(1) (z) if z1 ≤ z ≤ z2
αh(2) (z) if z2 ≤ z ≤ z3
......... ...................
αh(K) (z) if zK ≤ z ≤ zK+1 = y
where K is a finite integer and h(k) ∈ I for all k ∈ {0, ...K}.
For simplicity, write h(0) = i and h(K) = j. Now,
|α (y)− α (x)| = ∣∣αj (y)− αj (zK) + αj (zK)− αi (x)∣∣ =
=
∣∣αj (y)− αj (zK) + αh(K−1) (zK)− αi (x)∣∣ ≤
≤ ∣∣αj (y)− αj (zK)∣∣+ ∣∣αh(K−1) (zK)− αi (x)∣∣ .
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Iterating the triangle inequality and using Lemma 14, |αk (z)− αk (z′)| < |z − z′| for any
z, z′ ∈ [0, 1] and any k ∈ I, we obtain
|α (y)− α (x)| ≤ ∣∣αj (y)− αj (zK)∣∣+ K−1∑
k=1
∣∣αh(k) (zk+1)− αh(k) (zk)∣∣+ |αi (z1)− αi (x)| <
< |y − zK | +
K−1∑
k=1
|zk+1 − zk| + |z1 − x| = |y − x| .
A similar argument proves that α is a contraction whenever αi is a contraction for all
i ∈ I.
Lemma 16 If α and α are contractions in an interval [a, b] ⊂ [0, 1], then χi is also a
contraction in [a, b] for all i ∈ I.
Proof. Recall that for all i ∈ I χi(x) ∈ [α (x) ,α (x)] and that χi(x) ∈ (α (x) ,α (x))
implies χi(x) = pi. Consider any x, y ∈ [a, b] , x *= y, and assume w.l.o.g. that α (x) ≤
α(y). 13
Next, consider in turn each possible scenario.
1. [α(x),α(x)] ∩[α (y) ,α (y)] = [c, d] *= ∅, where c = α (y) and d = min {α (x) ,α(y)}.
(a) If pi ∈ [c, d] then χi(x) = χi(y) = pi.
(b) If pi < α (x) then χi(x) = α (x) and χi(y) = α (y).
(c) If α (x) ≤ pi < a, then χi(x) = pi and χi(y) = α (y). In this case, 0 <
χi(y)− χi(x) = α (y)− pi < α (y)− α(x).
13Note that we can have either α (x) ≤ α (y) or α (x) > α (y).
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(d) If d < pi ≤ max {α (x) ,α(y)} then either χi(x) = pi and χi(y) = α (y) when
α (x) = max {α (x) ,α(y)} or χi(x) = α (x) and χi(y) = pi. In the first case,
0 < χi(x) − χi(y) = pi − α (y) < α (x) − α(y). In the second case, 0 <
χi(y)− χi(x) = pi − α (x) < α (y)− α (x).
(e) If pi > max {α (x) ,α(y)} then χi(x) = α (x) and χi(y) = α(y).
2. [α(x),α(x)] ∩[α(y),α(y)] = ∅.
(a) If pi < α (x) then χi(x) = α (x) and χi(y) = α (y).
(b) If α (x) ≤ pi ≤ α(x) then χi(x) = pi and χi(y) = α (y). In this case, 0 <
χi(y)− χi(x) = α (y)− pi ≤ α (y)− α(x).
(c) If α(x) < pi < α(y) then χi(x) = α(x), χi(y) = α(y). Since α(x) < α(x) <
α(y), 0 < χi(y)− χi(x) = α(y)− α(x) < α(y)− α(x).
(d) If α(y) ≤ pi ≤ α(y) then χi(x) = α (x) and χi(y) = pi. Now, 0 < χi(y) −
χi(x) = pi − α(x) < α(y)− α(x).
(e) If pi > α(y) then χi(x) = α (x) and χi(y) = α(y).
In case 1 (a) it is immediate that |χi(y)− χi(x)| < |y − x|. For the remaining scenarios,
if α and α are contractions, then the inequality follows. Hence, if α and α are contractions
then χi(·) is a contraction for all i ∈ I.
Lemma 17 For each player i ∈ I and any ε > 0, there exists η > 0 and δε ∈ (0, 1) such
that for δ > δε
if x ∈ [pn−q+1 − η, pq + η] ∩ [0, 1] then |χi (x)− x| < ε.
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Proof. Denote by L = {i ∈ I : pi ≤ pn−q+1} and by R = {i ∈ I : pi ≥ pq} , and note the
following two facts:
(a) Every best response proposal χi (x) must be acceptable at least to a player j ∈ L, and
to a player k ∈ R. I.e., α (x) ≥ min {αk (x) : k ∈ R} and α(x) ≤ max {αj(x) : j ∈ L}.
(b) (i) If x ≤ pi then for each ε > 0 there is a δiε ∈ (0, 1) such that x− αi(x) < ε for all
δ ≥ δiε; and symmetrically (ii) if x ≥ pi then for each ε > 0 there is a δiε ∈ (0, 1)
such that αi(x)− x < ε for all δ ≥ δiε.(This claim is immediate from the definitions
of αi and αi and the continuity of ui).
Recall that χi (x) ∈ [α(x),α(x)] . Hence it suffices to show that for all ε > 0 there
exist η > 0 and δε ∈ (0, 1) such that, for x ∈ [pn−q+1 − η, pq + η] ∩ [0, 1] and δ ≥ δε,
x− α(x) < ε and α(x)− x < ε. We establish this claim next.
Case 1: Consider pn−q+1 ≤ x ≤ pq. By (a), χi (x) must be approved by some j ∈ L
and some k ∈ R. By (b)(i) for any ε > 0 and for any k ∈ R there is a δkε ∈ (0, 1)
such that x − αk(x) < ε for all δ ≥ δkε. Taking δR = max {δkε : k ∈ R}, since α (x) ≥
min {αk (x) : k ∈ R}, it follows that x − α(x) < ε for all δ ≥ δR. Similarly, by (b)(ii) we
conclude that there exists δL such that α(x)− x < ε for δ ≥ δL. Thus, for each ε > 0, the
claim follows for δ ≥ δε = max {δL, δR} .
Case 2: Consider x < pn−q+1. Again, by (a) χi (x) must be approved by some k ∈ R.
Using (b)(i) it is immediate that for any ε > 0 and for any k ∈ R, there is a δkε ∈ (0, 1)
such that x − αk(x) < ε for all δ ≥ δkε; taking δR = max {δkε : k ∈ R} it follows that
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0 < x− α(x) < ε for all δ ≥ δR.
Now consider α. For any ε > 0, we can choose η1 > 0 arbitrarily such that (by continu-
ity) if x ∈ [pn−q+1 − η1, pn−q+1]∩[0, 1] then there exist φ ≥ 0 and ε′ > 0 satisfying ε′+φ < ε
and ρi (x)−x ≤ φ for players i ∈ I with pi = pn−q+1. Morover, for players with pj < pn−q+1
if x ∈ [pn−q+1 − η2, pn−q+1] ∩ [0, 1], where η2 = min {pn−q+1 − pj : pj < pn−q+1}, then
ρj (x) = x.
Choose η ≤ min {η1,η2} and consider x ∈ [pn−q+1 − η, pn−q+1]∩ [0, 1]. Since ρj (x) ≥ pj
for all j ∈ L, using (b)(ii), we know that there exists δjε′ ∈ (0, 1) such that αj(ρj (x)) −
ρj (x) < ε′ when δ ≥ δjε′ . Then, choosing δL = max {δjε′ : j ∈ L} and noting that by
definition αj(ρj (x)) = αj(x), it follows that for any j ∈ L,
0 < αj(x)− x = (ρj (x)− x) + (αj(x)− ρj (x)) ≤ φ+ ε′ < ε when δ ≥ δL,
where we have used ρi (x) − x ≤ φ for all i with pi = pn−q+1 and ρj (x) − x = 0 for all j
with pj < pn−q+1.
Therefore, since by (a) α(x) ≤ max {αj(x) : j ∈ L}, we have that for x ∈ [pn−q+1 − η, pn−q+1]∩
[0, 1] then α(x)− x < ε for all δ ≥ δL.
Hence for every ε > 0, if η ≤ min {η1, η2}, δ ≥ δε = max {δL, δR}, and x ∈
[pn−q+1 − η, pn−q+1] ∩ [0, 1] then x− α(x) < ε and α(x)− x < ε.
Case 3: The case x > pq is analogous to Case 2.
Thus the claim is established and the proof is complete.
Lemma 18 Assume q > n/2. For each ε > 0 there is δε ∈ (0, 1) such that if δ ≥ δε and
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x = (x1, ...xi, ...xn) is an SSPE, then |xi − x1| < ε for all i ∈ I.
Proof.
Fix an SSPE, x = (x1, ...xi, ...xn) , and keep in mind that xj = χj (xj+1) .
Step 1: For all j ∈ I and all ηj > 0 there exists δjηj ∈ (0, 1) such that if δ ≥ δjηj then
xj ∈ [pn−q+1 − ηj, pq + ηj] ∩ [0, 1].
Note that q > n/2 implies the existence of a player i with pi ∈ [pn−q+1, pq], and that
for such player the best response χi (xi+1) lies in [pn−q+1, pq] regardless of the value of xi+1.
Hence, we may assume the following induction hypothesis: For player i, for any ηi > 0
there exists δiηi ∈ (0, 1) such that if δ ≥ δiηi then xi ∈ [pn−q+1 − ηi, pq + ηi] ∩ [0, 1]. Next
we show that the induction hypothesis implies in turn that for any ηi−1 > 0 there exists
δi−1ηi−1 ∈ (0, 1) such that if δ ≥ δi−1ηi−1 then xi−1 ∈ [pn−q+1 − ηi−1, pq + ηi−1] ∩ [0, 1].
Under the Induction hypothesis (that guarantees that, for any ηi > 0, xi ∈ [pn−q+1 − ηi, pq + ηi]∩
[0, 1] provided that δ ≥ δiηi), by Lemma 17, for any εi > 0 there exists δiεi ≥ δiηi such that
if δ ≥ δiεi , then |χi−1 (xi)− xi| < εi. Hence, we can conclude that for any ηi−1 > 0 there
exists δi−1ηi−1 ∈ (0, 1) such that if δ ≥ δi−1ηi−1 , then xi−1 ∈ [pn−q+1 − ηi−1, pq + ηi−1]∩[0, 1]
( just select εi and ηi such that εi + ηi ≤ ηi−1 and δi−1ηi−1 ≥ δiεi).!
Step 2: For all i ∈ I and all εi > 0, there exists 0 < δi < 1 such that if δ ≥ δi then
|xi−1 − xi| < εi.
By Lemma 17, for all εi > 0, there exists ηi > 0 and δεi ∈ (0, 1) such that (when
δ ≥ δεi) xi ∈ [pn−q+1 − ηi, pq + ηi] ∩ [0, 1] implies that |xi−1 − xi| < εi. Moreover, by
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the previous step, for any ηi > 0 there exists δiηi ∈ (0, 1) such that if δ ≥ δiηi , xi ∈
[pn−q+1 − ηi, pq + ηi] ∩ [0, 1]. Hence, selecting δi = max {δεi , δiηi} the claim follows. !
Step 3: To complete the proof, we check that for each ε we can select a δε such that
if δ ≥ δε then |x1 − xj| < ε for all j ∈ I.
Simply choose εi = ε/n and δε = max {δi : i ∈ I} such that |xi − xi+1| < εi when
δ ≥ δi. Then
|xj − x1| =
∣∣∣∣∣xj −
n−1∑
i=j+1
xi +
n−1∑
i=j+1
xi + xn − xn − x1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
≤
n−1∑
i=j
|xi − xi+1| + |xn − x1| ≤
n∑
i=j
εi < ε.
!
Lemma 19 Consider a game with q > n/2, and such that if z is an SSPE then zi ∈
(z − ε/2, z + ε/2) for all i ∈ I, where ε ∈ (0, D/2) and D = mini,j∈I {|pi − pj| : pi *= pj} .
If x and y are two SSPE with x < y, then |x− y| < ε and (x− ε/2, y + ε/2)∩{p1, ..., pn} =
pi for some i ∈ I.
Proof. Step 1. We rule out |x− y| ≥ ε.
By assumption the proposals that arise in x and y lie respectively in (x− ε/2, x + ε/2)
and (y − ε/2, y + ε/2). If |x− y| ≥ ε then (x− ε/2, x + ε/2) ∩ (y − ε/2, y + ε/2) = ∅,
implying that xi < yi for all i ∈ I. By Lemma 8, this implies that xi − xi−1 = xi −
χi−1 (xi) < yi − χi−1 (yi) = yi − yi−1 for all i ∈ I, and Lemma 9 implies a contradiction.
Step 2. |x− y| < ε and (x− ε/2, y + ε/2) ∩ {p1, ..., pn} = pi.
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Assume that there are two equilibria, x and y, with outcomes x < y, and proposals
lying on an interval with no peaks, say xi, yi ∈
(
pk, pk+1
)
for all i ∈ I. Then it is necessarily
the case that (pk, pk+1) ⊂ [pn−q+1, pq]; otherwise, for player j with pj ∈ [pn−q+1, pq] the
equilibrium proposal must be χj (xj+1) ∈ [pn−q+1, pq] *⊂ (pk, pk+1). If all proposals in both
equilibria lie in (pk, pk+1) ⊂ [pn−q+1, pq], for all i ∈ I, if xi = α (xi+1) then yi = α (yi+1),
and similarly if xi = α (xi+1) then yi = α (yi+1) . Hence, for z = x,y, if player i proposes
zi = α (zi+1) then α (zi+1) = αR,q−k (zi+1) where R =
{
i ∈ I : pi ≥ pk+1
}
and if j proposes
zj = α (zj+1) then α (zj+1) = αL,q−(n−k) (zj+1) where L =
{
i ∈ I : pi ≤ pk
}
. By single-
peakedness, xi+1 < yi+1 implies αk (xi+1) ≤ αk (yi+1) for all k ∈ R and αk (xi+1) ≤
αk (yi+1) for all k ∈ L, so that α (xi+1) ≤ α (yi+1) and α (xj+1) ≤ α (yj+1), where i and j
denote players proposing zi = α (zi+1) and zj = α (zj+1) respectively, for z = x, y. Hence,
if xi+1 < yi+1 then χi (xi+1) = xi < yi = χi (yi+1) . Since x1 = x < y = y1, then xi < yi
for all i ∈ I. Therefore, by Lemma 8, xi+1 − xi < yi+1 − yi for any i ∈ I; and by Lemma
9 we derive a contradiction.
Hence |x− y| < ε and (x− ε/2, y + ε/2) ∩ {p1, ..., pn} *= ∅. Moreover, since ε < D/2,
(x− ε/2, y + ε/2) ∩ {p1, ..., pn} must be singleton, so that the result follows.
Lemma 20 For every profile of continuous and single-peaked utility functions there exist
ε ∈ (0, 1), such that the following holds for all i ∈ I:
SIGN: Either |λi (x)− λi (y)| ≤ |ρi (x)− ρi (y)| for all x, y ∈ [p− ε, p + ε], or the reverse
weak inequality holds throughout this interval.
48
Proof. Consider any player with peak pi = p and utility ui = u. The claim is obvious
when p ∈ {0, 1}, since either λ (x) = λ (y) = 0 or ρ (x) = ρ (y) = 1 for all x, y ∈
[p− ε, p + ε] ∩ [0, 1] , for any ε > 0.
Assume p ∈ (0, 1), let u = max {u(0), u(1)} < u (p) and consider l−1 : [u, u (p)]→ [0, 1]
and r−1 : [u, u (p)] → [0, 1]. These functions are increasing and decreasing respec-
tively, continuous and (by definition) l−1 (u (p)) = r−1 (u (p)) = p. Define function
f : [u, u (p)] → [0, 1] as f (u) = [r−1 (u)− p] − [p− l−1 (u)] . Since f is continuous and
f (u (p)) = 0, there exists u ∈ [u, u (p)] such that for all u ∈ [u, u (p)] either (i) f is
non-increasing and f (u) ≥ 0, or (ii) f is non-decreasing and f (u) ≤ 0.
Take an ε > 0 such that for all z ∈ [p− ε, p + ε], both u (λ (z)) ≥ u and u (ρ (z)) ≥ u.
We will show next that either |λ (x)− λ (y)| ≤ |ρ (x)− ρ (y)| for all x, y ∈ [p− ε, p + ε],
or the reverse weak inequality holds throughout this interval.
Assume (i), consider any x, y ∈ [p− ε, p + ε] , and assume w.l.o.g. that ρ (x) < ρ (y),
which implies (by single-peakedness) λ (x) > λ (y) (note that ρ (x) = ρ (y) implies λ (x) =
λ (y) and either weak inequality holds trivially). Since u (ρ (x)) > u (ρ (y)), by (i) we have
that f (u (ρ (x)))− f (u (ρ (y))) ≤ 0; that is
r−1 (u (ρ (x))) + l−1 (u (ρ (x)))− r−1 (u (ρ (y)))− l−1 (u (ρ (y))) ≤ 0
Since by definition, r−1 (u (ρ (z))) = ρ (z) and l−1 (u (ρ (z))) = λ (z) for z = x, y, we get
ρ (x) + λ (x)− ρ (y)− λ (y) ≤ 0, or equivalently,
λ (x)− λ (y) ≤ ρ (y)− ρ (x) .
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Therefore, since ρ (x) < ρ (y) and λ (x) > λ (y) , we conclude that
|λ (x)− λ (y)| ≤ |ρ (x)− ρ (y)| for all x, y ∈ [p− ε, p + ε] .
Similar arguments apply to case (ii). Then f non-decreasing and f (z) ≤ 0 for all z ∈
[u, u (p)] , implies that |λ (x)− λ (y)| ≥ |ρ (x)− ρ (y)| for all x, y ∈ [p− ε, p + ε] .
Lemma 21 Consider a profile of MCD utilities. Let [a, b] ⊂ [0, 1] and Q ⊂ I,#Q ≥
n− q + 1.
(i) If pj ≥ b for all j ∈ Q and αj (z) ≥ αk (z) for all z ∈ [a, b] and all k ∈ I\Q, then
α is a contraction in [a, b].
(ii) If pj ≤ a for all j ∈ Q and αj (z) ≤ αk (z) for all z ∈ [a, b] and all k ∈ I\Q, then
α is a contraction in [a, b].
Proof. We prove statement (i), the proof of (ii) is analogous. Let s = q−#(I\Q). Since
α (z) = αI,q (x) and, for any j ∈ Q, αj (z) ≥ αk (z) for all k ∈ I\Q, then α (z) = αQ,s (x).
Consider z, z′ ∈ [a, b], z < z′. Since #Q ≥ n − q + 1, there are at least n − q + 1
players j ∈ Q such that αj (z′) ≥ α (z′). Since α (z) must be acceptable at least to
one of those players, say h ∈ Q, it must be that αh (z) ≤ α (z). Thus, MCD implies
z − α (z) ≤ z − αh (z) < z′ − αh (z′) ≤ z′ − α (z′). Moreover, single-peakedness assures
that αj (z) ≤ αj (z′) for all j ∈ Q and therefore, since α (x) = αQ,s (x) , it must be that
α (z) ≤ α (z′). Thus, |α (z′)− α (z)| < |z′ − z| for all z, z′ ∈ [a, b] .
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